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Political Versus Administrative Justice
Stephanos Bibas*
 Rachel Barkow’s essay captures an important and overlooked
dimension of the decline of mercy: the administrative ideal of justice
as rules and discretion as danger.  Though most commentators
applaud this trend to equate law with specified, judicially enforceable
rules, Barkow rightly finds it worrisome and regrettable.
The problem, as Barkow explains, is that equating justice with
rules makes the law judiciocentric.  Emphasizing rules does reduce
dangers of discrimination and idiosyncratic preferences.  But it hardly
eliminates them, as shown by prosecutors’ manipulation of sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties.  While actors may
comply with moderately binding rules, rigid rules simply drive
discretion underground.  A mandatory death penalty for all thefts of
forty shillings, for example, drove colonial jurors to “pious perjury” by
downvaluing thefts to thirty-nine shillings.1
Deferring to government officials makes sense when they
possess technocratic expertise.  But, as Barkow notes, criminal justice
policy is much more about lay moral intuitions than about apolitical
expertise.  That is the message of Apprendi and its progeny: criminal
justice policy belongs at least in part in the hands of populist juries
because they enjoy democratic legitimacy.
One could imagine a criminal justice system that depended
more on political than on doctrinal legal checks and balances.
Prosecutors’ decisions would be publicized and more open to scrutiny,
so that their statistics would become live issues in district attorneys’
electoral campaigns.  Victims and community members would have
greater information and participation in the prosecution of crimes, to
check prosecutors’ agency costs.  Media coverage would give voters
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bigger-picture statistics as well as finer evaluation of police and
prosecutorial misconduct.   Better data collection and dissemination
would promote this media coverage.  Trials and clemency proceedings
would be thoroughly public, allowing voters to reach their own
conclusions about which defendants deserve acquittal, pardon, or
mercy.  Indeed, that vision harkens back to colonial American
criminal justice: victims prosecuted pro se, the public sat in judgment
in the jury box, and gossip about trials and punishment spread
throughout small communities.2
Moving away from this administrative ideal would weaken the
judiciary’s strong commitment to policing equal treatment.  But
judicial regulation has not stamped out racial profiling or race
disparities in capital sentencing, whereas state executive branches
have recently attacked both problems head-on.3  Judges need not
view criminal justice as their exclusive countermajoritarian province,
but can trust political branches more.
Barkow is right, then, to question our reverence for
administrative models.  Procedural reform, expertise, and formality do
not always translate into substantive legal and moral justice.  On the
contrary, popular morality has room for mercy as well as justice,
discretion as well as rules.  But how far is Barkow willing to go?  She
is nostalgic for jury discretion, but in an era of plea bargaining,
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political justice must rely on other actors.  Would she trust
prosecutorial elections and legislative oversight hearings to regulate
mercy, in the absence of active judicial oversight?  Does she trust
these majoritarian processes to prevent discrimination?  Would she
allow victims and community members much larger roles, even at the
expense of equal treatment?  And can we still trust executive
clemency despite the Clinton pardon scandal and the political
pressure to act tough so long as one faces re-election?
While Barkow still has to work out these details, her overall
message is sound.  Lawyers have tried too hard to squelch discretion,
as the rule-of-law ideal has hypertrophied.  Discretion is necessary,
and it should be more transparent and democratically accountable.
Politics, reasoned judgment, and empathy deserve overt roles.
Legislators and judges must be more humble about the power of rules
and trust other actors more.  Judges, Barkow rightly suggests, should
stop trying to stamp out the political and moral judgments inherent
in criminal-justice discretion.
